Chinese Actions on LAC widens trust deficit between generations

                                                                                                            

Historically speaking, being a civilization state both India and China exhibit some kind of similar tendencies for engagement and cooperation. From cooperation in art, culture, literature and language to recent engagements in areas of information and technology, education and youth, tourism and media, urban planning and infrastructure, trade and commerce etc. The foundation for this goes back to the past, when the two states formed ‘strong cultural links’ between them in various aspects. Over the years, all these developments collectively contributed to the definite levels of ‘trust building’ between both the states. 

  However, as both the old civilizations transformed into the birth of modern nation states like as socialist Republic of China (1949) and Indian democratic republic (1947), the bilateral relations gradually lost the ‘warmth and wisdom’ of their civilizational past. This has happened more precisely post 1962 war between India and China. While Sino India rapprochement (1989), shared vision for the twenty first century (2008), celebration of sixty years of Panchasheel Declaration (2014), Asian Century (2015) and Wuhan Spirit (2018) does mark some ‘positive signaling’ in bilateral relations. Still the bilateral relationship over the years does suffer from a major gap in ‘trust factor’ between both the states. 

And the recent incident at Ladakh has ‘more seriously’ impaired the trust factor in bilateral relations for another generation in future. This has happened across the establishment, beginning from the leadership level to the civil society discourses. As both the powers fail to come on ‘agreed terms’ to ‘disengage and de-escalate’ the present standoff, the situation remains tensed with military mobilization backed by ‘simmering signals’ from both sides. The tone might have come down but the intent remains more or less clear in terms of what both the states are looking for amidst the dispute. 

For the Indian side, this has become more a question of ‘national self esteem’ under the popular leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which is aiming to build space for an aspirational ‘New India’ in the global politics. Indian leadership has been taken aback by this incident which has come to them more as surprise, given the background and efforts they have been putting to ‘stabilise relations’ with China. India is very clear that all its border infrastructure activities are within the Indian side of LAC, and Chinese have moved ahead beyond the LAC. The loss of life has also added much heat and anger to this argument affecting bilateral relations. 

Moreover, the Indian scholarship on China is also raising some critical questions on the recent Chinese behaviour at the border. To say, if this amounts to any kind of ‘deliberate provocation’ by Chinese, and to what insinuated Chinese to change the status unilaterally on the ground. Some have raised questions on the ‘timing of incident’ and if this resonates with the new role of China as ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the global politics amidst the Corona pandemic.  

The bigger question now stands as to what now for India-China relations in future? And which way it is going to move forward in coming years. 

As advocated by former Indian Foreign Minister late Smt. Sushma Swaraj, during her maiden visit to China in September 2014, the present dispute shall lead to new calls for more ‘set of reciprocity’ by India towards well formed notions of  ‘One China Policy’. After 2014, India has not put much ‘diplomatic force’ on this formulation but as the situation unfolds at the border, and China’s calls for discussion on Kashmir at UN Security Council. India is now more carefully weighing its options on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the South China Sea. In future, India is more likely to calibrate its One India policy in dealing with China.

Given the call for making ‘Self-reliant’ India by the Prime Minister Modi, India will seriously weigh its ‘economic policy options’ to outweigh China from some of its key sectors. The banning of 59 Chinese apps and revision of business contracts of many Chinese investment companies in major Indian infrastructural ventures is the recent move by Indian leadership. One report suggests, this leads to potential advertising revenue loss for these companies ranging from 6 to 10 billion USD. 

In the last four decades Indian approach to China has been mostly shaped by its soft power outreach efforts and initiatives. In the Indian policy discourse, this looks India-China relations in a more ‘geo-civilizational framework. Given these developments, the ‘hard power quotient’ is more likely to play and reshape the India’s policy towards China. This also calls for the need for strengthening conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities in the border areas for India. It is more likely that India shall identify China as a ‘potential threat’ for its interests in the contemporary world.

The Indo-pacific region could emerge as ‘new theatre’ for rivalry in the backdrop of India-Australia virtual summit and recent boasting of maritime cooperation with US. Capturing less engagement, the ‘managing China’ factor is going to play more dominant role for India while dealing with China at the regional and global level. 

It took a long for Indians to move beyond the ghost of 1962 war with China. But the Galwan incident has reaffirmed the ‘absolute trust deficit’ between both for another generation. 

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